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I.  INTRODUCTION
Understanding the channels that transmit monetary shocks to real economic activity
has always been an issue in the economics profession.  In the monetary economics literature,
different monetary transmission channels exist
1: the interest rate channel, the exchange rate
channel, equity price channels and credit channels.  The ambiguous role of money stock in
linking the price dynamics of financial and real sectors has directed the focus on the
transmission through credit channels.  The credit view of monetary transmission emphasizes
the role of disaggregating non-monetary assets, such as bonds and bank loans.  The credit
view can be analysed with two perspectives: the narrow bank lending perspective and the
broader balance sheet channel perspective.  The former, which is the subject of this study, is
limited to bank lending behaviour, while the latter, which links firm investment decisions
with bank lending behaviour, captures all credit market interactions.
As the major financial intermediary institutions in the economy, banks play a
significant role in the determination of output by supplying funds for investment finance in
the real economy.  Bank loans constitute the major part of the sources of external finance for
most firms.  Therefore, economic activity appears to be sensitive to shocks on bank lending
behaviour.  Any monetary shock influencing the bank reserves is expected to cause asset re-
allocation in the bank balance sheets.  If this allocation cannot be done in such a way that the
effects of the shock are absorbed by some other assets than loans, the availability of bank
loans to firms and, hence, the investment decisions of the bank-dependent firms, will be
affected.  It has to be noted that this effect is a supply effect rather than a demand effect
generated by changes in the interest rates.  The supply effect, which is transmitted by the
credit channel, and the demand effect, which is transmitted by the interest rate channel, can be
observed together.  However, realizing the relative magnitudes of these effects may be
important for the precision in policy making.
The factors that increase the relative potency of the transmission through the credit
channel are credit market imperfections.  The major imperfections that influence the lending
behaviour of banks are their asymmetric cost structures in raising external finance and in
evaluating and monitoring loan contracts.  The difference in the size of banks is one of the
factors that can be considered as the cause of asymmetric cost structures.  The asset size
differences among banks may reflect the basis of the relative cost advantages in banks’ raising
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external finance.  This asymmetry leads to disproportionate lending responses of banks to
monetary shocks unless banks buffer themselves against shocks through their liquid assets.
The disproportionate lending responses of banks to monetary shocks are also transmitted to
bank dependent firms in a disproportionate manner.  Provided that the majority of the
producer firms are dependent on bank loans as a source of external finance, there will be real
output effects of monetary shocks in the aggregate economy because the supply of funds for
financing investment projects and working capital needs are affected.  Therefore,
investigating the loan supply responses of banks is a crucial step in testing the credit view,
particularly, the bank lending channel.
Understanding the interaction between banks and the real economy in Turkey requires
theoretical and empirical investigations on the bank lending channel of the monetary
transmission mechanism.  Since recently, the linkage between the banking structure and
economic stability has been on the agenda of policy makers in order to reduce the propagated
effects of banking crises.  In this respect, the tendency of re-structuring the banking system in
Turkey has been such that a few large banks exist and the share of public banks is reduced for
economic stability.  In practical terms, this indicates that in the Turkish economy a bank
lending channel, which propagates the output effects of monetary shocks seems to be
prevailing.
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the presence of an active bank lending
channel in Turkey.  The empirical investigations are focused on the bank lending behaviour of
58 deposit money banks in the Turkish banking system over the period 1988-1999.  To our
knowledge, this is the first study in the literature analysing the bank lending channel of
monetary transmission in the Turkish economy.  Moreover, the estimation methodology of the
empirical analysis used in the study differs from that of similar studies in the literature,
providing econometrically more efficient model estimates.
The plan of the study is as follows.  The second part is a presentation of the credit
view of the monetary transmission mechanism, explaining the operational features of the
credit channel, the role of informational asymmetries on the dynamics of the credit markets,
and the preconditions for monetary policy to affect the economic activity through the bank
lending channel.  This part also contains an overview of the credit market and banking
structures in the Turkish economy in the period in question.  The empirical investigation of
the subject takes place in the third part of the study.  This part starts with the modelling
aspects of the bank lending channel, continues with brief descriptions of the econometric5
methodology and the data exploited in the study, and ends with the estimation results.  The
study is completed with concluding remarks based on the empirical findings.
2. THE CREDIT VIEW OF THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
2.1. The Credit Channel
The traditional ‘money view’ of the monetary transmission mechanism is based on the
so-called  money or interest rate channel, featured by the standard Keynesian IS-LM
framework.  The basic assumptions that characterize the interest rate channel are: i) sticky-
price adjustment to money supply shocks, ii) direct control of the monetary authority on
nominal money supply by adjusting reserves, and iii) presence of two assets such as money
and bonds where loans are perfect substitutes for bonds.  In the context of the last assumption,
there is no need to explicitly model bank behaviour in explaining the money-output causation.
However, the ‘credit view’ of the monetary transmission mechanism puts a special emphasis
on the role of financial intermediaries or banks in the aggregate economic activity.
The role of intermediation in the monetary economics literature has been ignored with
the assumptions of perfect capital markets and homogenous financial structure, in the context
of what is known as the Modigliani-Miller theorem.  As such, finance is postulated to be a
“veil” which implies that intermediary institutions are redundant and the financial structure of
firms is irrelevant to real output effects.  However, Bernanke (1983) rejects this postulate and
states the role of economic institutions in producing real effects.  Referring to the persistent
effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s, Bernanke argues that the increased credit
intermediation costs, coupled with credit squeeze during the financial crisis, propagate the
real effects of the turmoil.  This indicates the significance of financial intermediary
institutions in affecting the transaction costs and thus the real economic activity.  Following
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1987), when loans are assumed
imperfect substitutes, the monetary transmission mechanism operates not only through the
interest rate channel, but through a credit channel as well.  It is now assumed that firms can
finance their investments by bank loans as well as bonds, and banks’ asset portfolio now
consist of loans beside reserves and bonds in simple terms.  Within this three assets
framework, banks play a significant role in the determination of output dynamics, which is
not the case in the two assets framework of the money view.
Market imperfection in the banking system is one of the crucial points that contribute
to the presence of a credit channel.  Bernanke and Gertler (1987, 1989, 1995) point to capital6
market frictions originating from imperfect information aspects.  Heterogeneous structure of
borrowers in the credit markets incurs different costs to lenders in evaluating and monitoring
credit contracts.  Informational asymmetry between the lender and borrower puts a wedge
between the costs of internal and external funds, which is being referred to as “external
finance premium” by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).  It is argued that the potency of the
monetary policy is reflected not only by interest rates, but by the external finance premium as
well
2.  Thus, Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 28) state that the credit channel is not a distinct,
independent or a parallel channel, but rather “…a set of factors that amplify and propagate
conventional interest rate effects”.
The influence of monetary shocks on real economic activity has two dimensions in the
credit view.  First, a monetary shock can influence the financial position or the net worth of a
borrower firm.  A higher net worth of a firm’s balance sheet makes external financing from
the loan market possible and, hence, stimulates investment decisions.  As the transmission of
monetary shocks to the real economy occurs through the borrowers’ balance sheets, this
channel is called the balance sheet channel.  Second, a monetary shock can influence the
banks’ loan supply to bank-dependent firms.  This change in the availability of loans
influences the investment decisions of the borrower firms by reducing an external source of
finance. The transmission through such a channel is called the bank lending channel.
Balance Sheet Channel
 The balance sheet approach to the monetary transmission mechanism embodies the
features that links a firm’s investment decision with monetary shocks through changes in the
firm’s financial position.  Interest rate effects of a monetary shock have two direct effects on
the net worth of a borrower firm; first, by influencing interest payments on outstanding debt,
and second by influencing the asset prices.  The former influences the net cash flow and
profits of the firm while the latter influences the value of collateral assets of the borrower
firm.  Moreover, as an indirect effect, a monetary shock influences the spending of the firm’s
customers thereby influencing the wedge between the revenues and fixed costs of the firm in
the short-run.  Both of these direct and indirect effects determine the firm’s net worth and
credit-worthiness and hence the firm’s borrowing capability from the loan market.  As a
result, the extent to which the real economy is affected depends on how external finance
premium and balance sheets of firms are affected by monetary shocks.
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Bank Lending Channel:  The bank lending approach to the monetary transmission
mechanism appears to be another important channel of credit view as there are bank-
dependent borrowers who have few or no alternative sources of finance other than bank loans.
Any frictions in the asset-liability management of banks due to monetary shocks would be
transmitted to real economic activity through the bank-dependent producers in the economy.
A tight monetary policy draining reserves from the banking system would restrict the supply
of loanable funds so that it increases the external finance premium of the bank-dependent
borrower firms.  The effect of a monetary shock on the external finance premium of small size
firms is assumed to be higher than it is on large ones under the assumptions that large size
firms have easier access to credit markets and have more alternative sources of finance.  In
this sense, output fluctuations due to monetary shocks can be explained not only by interest
rate effects, but by external finance premium effects as well.  Presence of an active bank
lending channel may serve to explain the amplified and propagated conventional effects of
policy shocks.  It has to be noted that since the bank lending channel focuses only on the
lending behaviour of banks affected by monetary policy shocks, this transmission channel
view is assumed to be a narrow-type credit channel approach.
2.2.  Asymmetric Information and Bank Lending Behaviour
Since the scope of this study is limited to bank behaviour in the operation of credit
channels, the focus will be on how credit market imperfections are related to the bank lending
behaviour or the bank lending channel of the monetary transmission process.  In this
perspective, Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 2000) have contributed to the credit view
literature with significant theoretical and empirical studies.  As argued in Kashyap and Stein
(1995: 153), “there is no a priori reason to think that capital market imperfections should be
less important for banking firms than for non-financial firms”.
Similar to the dynamics behind how external finance premium for non-financial firms
are affected by credit market imperfections, banks, too, can experience frictions in raising
non-deposit external finance.  Sometimes, banks themselves are borrowers from domestic and
international financial institutions, and thus, implications of informational asymmetries for
credit contracts arranged between banks and their creditors cannot be ignored in shaping bank
lending behaviour.  Moreover, banks can raise external finance from the public or institutions
through mutual funds or certificates of deposit.  Unless these financial instruments or other
non-deposit sources of finance are insured officially, the costs of informational asymmetry to
investors will be nonzero, and therefore, investors will behave selectively by seeking to8
purchase the instruments of banks with a good reputation or by challenging return
opportunities.  However, gaining reputation or providing challenging opportunities increases
the banks’ costs of raising external finance.  As a result, frictions in the liability side of bank
balance sheets due to costs of raising non-deposit external finance would generate real effects
on the asset side.  The potency of a bank lending channel significantly depends on these real
effects on assets, especially on bank loans.
The influence of informational frictions in raising external funds on bank lending
behaviour can be identified through allowing a cross-sectional categorization among banks in
terms of their varying characteristics.  In this context, Kashyap and Stein (1995) categorize
banks in terms of their asset size, while Kashyap and Stein (2000) emphasize the liquidity
structure of banks along with the asset size.  Asset size can be considered as a proxy for
informational costs of raising external funds while liquidity is assumed to be an indicator of
robustness towards policy shocks.  In this sense, small size banks are assumed to be exposed
to higher informational costs than large ones in raising external funds, and therefore, any
policy shock to the liabilities of banks would generate more significant real effects on the
assets of small banks.  However, small size banks with high liquidity ratios may endure
monetary policy shocks without significantly changing their lending behaviour.  Therefore,
categorizing banks in terms of their balance sheet liquidity provides evidence in identifying
the loan supply effects of monetary policy shocks on bank assets.  Especially, as argued by
Kashayap and Stein (2000), the stronger lending response of small illiquid banks is an
indicator of a loan supply effect rather than a cyclical demand effect.  Thus, differentiating the
loan supply effect from a loan demand effect appears to be a crucial point in investigating the
presence of a bank lending channel.
2.3.  The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy on Bank Lending
The credit view literature provides evidence on the real effects of monetary policy
and, in this regard, the bank lending channel in the credit view clarifies the link between bank
balance sheets and these real effects.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that a tight
monetary policy affects the composition of bank assets: a contraction in deposits, first, causes
a liquidation of security stocks and then, a contraction in loans with a certain lag due to their
quasi-contractual commitment characteristics.  However, whether the change in the
composition of bank assets would generate real effects or not depends on how banks of
different characteristics respond to the monetary policy.9
Categorization of banks with respect to the asymmetry in their costs of raising external
funds would be a basis for revealing the disproportionate effects of monetary policy on bank
balance sheets and, hence, on bank lending.  The disproportionate effects on loans, when
transmitted to bank dependent borrowers are expected to influence the real economic activity
through the bank lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.  However, there
are some preconditions for the lending channel to operate
3.  First, there should be borrowers
whose investment decisions are primarily dependent on bank finance.  Second, monetary
authority should be capable of influencing bank lending behaviour through the policy
instruments.
The existence of bank dependency in the credit markets may be explained by the fact
that high fixed costs of evaluating and monitoring investment projects encourage firms to
arrange loan contracts with banks rather than with non-bank institutions.  As stated in
Kashyap and Stein (1994:228), bank dependent borrowers exist because loan contracts
arranged with banks are “taken as good news by the stock market” and moreover, there are
“lender-specific lock-in effects” which make some borrowers prefer to continue their
established relationships with banks.  Additionally, there are investment projects that require
information-gathering technologies accessible only by banks.  The lock-in effects may be one
of the outcomes of this technological monopoly.
The effectiveness of monetary policy on lending behaviour depends on both the
structure of credit markets and asset-liability management aspects of banks.  The existence of
non-bank institutions as lenders in credit markets may weaken the influence of monetary
policy on the bank lending behaviour.  However, Kashyap and Stein (1994:229) argue that the
role of non-bank institutions as “marginal lenders” is not challenging because of the fact that
lock-in effects incur significant costs on borrowers while switching to other sources of credits.
In the context of asset-liability management, weak policy effects are of concern when
banks are able to resist monetary policy by liquidating their security portfolios or by raising
non-deposit or non-reservable funds to continue lending.  Both for tight monetary policy
shocks and for deposit withdrawals, banks hold liquid assets as buffer stocks by giving up
lending.  Although the substitution between the loans and the liquid assets depends basically
on their relative yields, small size banks may prefer to hold higher proportions of securities
due to their frictions in raising deposit and non-deposit funds.  The heterogeneity in bank
lending behaviour increases the potency of a bank lending channel.  Note that if banks were
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homogenously able to raise non-reservable funds from capital markets or use securities as
buffer stocks during monetary shocks, there would be no room for the monetary authority to
be able to exert a policy that generates real effects.  As long as credit markets are
characterized with asymmetric information and banks exhibit heterogeneity in lending
behaviour due to costs of raising external funds, there would be real effects transmitted to the
economy through borrowers’ distorted investment decisions.
Kashyap (1994) emphasizes the role of risk-based capital requirements in weakening
the expansionary effects of monetary policy on bank lending.  Under capital requirements,
banks are not able to increase loans unless they manage to increase their equity capital.
Therefore, monetary expansion leads to an increase only in the security holdings of the banks,
without affecting their loan supply.
2.4. An Overview of the Credit Market and Banking in the Turkish Economy
As a preliminary step in the analysis of the bank lending channel, the bank-
dependency of firms in Turkey can be investigated simply by analysing the composition of
bank assets and the liability side of the consolidated balance sheets of firms.  In fact, complete
and accurate conclusions on this subject can only be drawn through detailed studies on the
broad credit channel, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Consolidated balance sheet data of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Turkey indicate
that the average share of credit extended to private companies and individual corporations is
62 % of the total DMBs credit (see Table 2.1).  These credits to firms constitute 13 % of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1986-2000 period, on the average.  The stably
increasing share of bank credits to firms in GDP, from 11 % to 18 %, also indicates the
increasing role of DMBs as intermediaries in credit markets (see Figure 2.1).
The relatively high share of bank credits as a source of external finance reveals the
bank-dependency nature of firms in Turkey.  As seen in Table 2.2, two major sources of
external finance for firms in Turkey are bank credits and trade credits.  With respect to the
average figures of the 1989-1999 period, 79 % of the financial debts of the firms are bank
credits and this constitutes 22 % of the total liabilities of firms.  As the second major source
of external finance, firms use trade credits without issuing commercial papers, which
constitutes 75 % of the total trade debts of firms.  In fact, however, trade credits are also
influenced by the availability of bank credits as bank credits may also contribute to the firms’
potential for extending trade credits to each other.  In this respect, Ersel and Öztürk (1990),11
Sak and Ersel (1995) and Atiyas and Yülek (1997) confirm the fact that bank credits appear to
be the major source of external finance for the manufacturing firms in Turkey.
The financial liberalization process, which started in the 1980s, has led to the growth
of the banking sector in Turkey.  With the liberalization attempts, the sector has been opened
to competition, and the availability and variety of sources of finance has been increased
Table 2. 1  Credit Composition of Deposit Money Banks 1986-2000
Percentage (%) Share in Total Credits
       Companies and Individual Corporations 62
       Households 7
       Non-financial Public Enterprises 7
       Financial Institutions 3
       Central Government 2
       Local Government 1
       Agricultural Sales & Credit Cooperatives 1
       Other 17
Source:  Electronic Data Delivery System of CBRT at http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html
Table 2. 2  Shares of Consolidated Balance Sheet Items of Firms in the Total Liability, 1989-1999
Percentage (%) Share in Total Liability
       Financial Debts
                 (Bank Credits)
28
(22)
       Trade Debts
                (Credits without Commercial Papers)




       Equity Capital
                (Share-in Capital)
34
(16)
Source: CBRT Sectoral Balance Sheets
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considerably.  The flexible exchange rate regime and the positive real interest rate policy
accommodated a substantial growth in the size of bank balance sheets.  A significant factor
that influenced the structure of bank balance sheets has been the increasing budget deficit12
finance through the issue of government securities after mid 1980s.  Commercial banks have
been the major customers of the government debt instruments since then.  In this respect, the
monetary authority has been left with a reserve accommodation policy in order not to increase
the cost of domestic debt financing.  Consequently, this process has led to the expansion of
the asset size of the Turkish banking system.  High inflation rates and high interest rates as a
result of the increasing public debt have shortened the maturity structure of bank liabilities
and have led banks to hold higher proportions of government security in liquid assets.  The
higher real returns and low risk on government securities have been more favourable for
backing bank liabilities.
The share of total bank assets in GDP trends upward, from about 40 % in the 1990s to
about 80 % towards the year 2000.  As seen in Figure 2.2, the balance sheet growth speeds up
after 1994.  On the asset side, the share of total bank credit stocks in GDP increases to over 20
% after 1994 and the share of government security holdings in GDP, which is around 4 %
until 1995, peaks to 13 % afterwards.  Figures in Table 2.3 show that in the 1995-2000 period
compared to 1986-1994 period, the average security portfolio share of GDP doubles with the
doubling average share of government security holdings in GDP.  However, the average share
of credit stocks in GDP does not grow as fast as that of government security stocks in GDP in
the later period.  Furthermore, the share of credit stocks in total bank assets on the average
falls after 1994.  As a result, the growth in the size of bank balance sheets after 1994 is mostly
due to the change in the asset composition in favour of government security holdings.  Such
an outcome indicates the fact that banks’ lending to the government through increased
holdings of government securities seems to crowd out the funds available to private borrowers
after 1994.  As Figure 2.3 illustrates, the time pattern of the ratio of the change in the
government security stocks of DMBs to the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)
clearly reflects how public deficits have been increasingly financed through the funds of
DMBs from 1994 onwards.
On the liability side, due to positive real interest rates, the banks’ major source of
external finance has always been deposit funds despite their high costs of raising (see Figure
2.2 and Table 2.3).  Additionally, the sustained inflationary environment in Turkey and, thus,
the tendency for currency substitution, have increased the amount of foreign exchange
deposits at banks.  The average ratio of deposit funds to the total bank assets has been around
60-70 % in the 1986-2000 period.  The introduction of full insurance on deposits in 1994 may
further explain the growing share of deposits in GDP after 1994.13
As reflected in the second panel of Figure 2.2, the share of non-deposit funds in GDP
begins to follow an increasing trend after the liberalization of capital accounts in 1989, except
for the interruption of the 1994 financial crisis.  However, the major component that feeds the
increasing trend of non-deposit funds is the bank credits from abroad.  Although the share of
non-deposit funds in GDP does not increase substantially –its share in total assets even falls
after 1994- the share of foreign credits in total non-deposit funds increases considerably after
1994 (see Table 2.3).  However, since the availability of these funds is sensitive to economy
wide risks, positive bank specific factors may not be sufficient to raise substantial amounts of
Table 2.3  The Shares of some Balance Sheet Items in GDP and Total Assets
Percentage (%)            Share in GDP      Share in Total Assets
1986-1994 1995-2000 1986-1994 1995-2000
Asset Side Items
       Security Portfolio









       Credit Stocks 18.3 22.2 40.1 35.4
Liability Side Items
       Deposit Funds 28.8 44.7 61.6 69.4
       Non-deposit funds
                   (Credits)
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  Source:  Electronic Data Delivery System of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey at
  http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html
these kind of funds when necessary.  In this context, depending on the degree of frictions in
raising non-deposit funds, any policy shock to bank deposits seems to require significant
reallocation of bank assets.
3.  THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1.  The Model
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) incorporate the bank lending channel into the goods and
money market equilibrium framework through the explicit inclusion of bank loans in the
equilibrium dynamics.  The basic assumption of this modified framework is that bonds and
loans are not perfect substitutes any more as they were in the IS-LM framework and therefore,
at present, financial market dynamics are characterized by the supply of and demand for three
assets: money, bonds and bank loans.
Owing to the imperfect substitutability of bonds and bank loans, the three assets
framework requires a modification to the traditional IS curve so that the new negatively
sloped curve is obtained, which is called the CC (commodity and credit) curve by Bernanke
and Blinder (1988).  Unlike in the IS-LM framework, a shock to bank reserves not only shifts
the LM curve due to a change in the quantity of money, but also shifts the CC curve through
stimulating firm investments owing to an increased volume of loans.  It has to be noted that in
the CC-LM framework, monetary shocks can be transmitted to real economic activity without
any significant change in bond interest rates because investment demand may be satisfied by
increased volume of bank loans, without causing any substantial change in the demand for
bonds.  Hence, the monetary policy transmission can occur through other ways than the
interest rate channel.15
The effects of monetary policy on the lending behaviour in the CC-LM framework can
be investigated by focusing on a simplified version of a bank balance sheet, following
Bernanke and Blinder (1988).  The asset side is assumed to consist of bonds (B), loans (L)
and reserves (R) –the sum of required reserves (RR) and excess reserves (ER)- while the
liability side is assumed to consist of only deposits (D):
B + L + R = D                                                  (3-1)
Required reserves are a fraction of bank deposits depending on the reserve requirement ratio
(r) and banks hold excess reserves beyond the level of required reserves depending on the
opportunity costs of holding bonds (iB) and loans (iL):
D . r RR =                                                              (3-2)
() D ). r 1 .( i , i ER L B − ϕ =                                                      (3-3)
Using R=ER+RR and making the necessary substitutions, the balance sheet constraint of a
bank given in (1) can be re-written as





 − + − ϕ = +
−
                                  (3-4)
where the term in big brackets is a non-constant multiplier that can be denoted by a function
γ (.). From (3-4), a bank loan supply function as the following can be derived:









                                                               (3-5)
It means that any change in the bank reserves, especially a change in monetary policy, would
cause a proportionate change in loans where this proportion γ  depends on the rates of return
on assets and on the reserve requirement ratio.  Higher interest rates on bonds and a higher
reserve requirement ratio would slow down the expansionary effects of bank reserves on
lending, while higher loan interest rates would stimulate bank lending.  However, in fact, the
spread between the rates of return on bonds and loans are more plausible in explaining the
loan supply movements owing to desired asset substitution behaviour.
According to the model, the loan supply function given with equation (3-5) can be
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where the i-subscript represents the cross-section dimension of the individual bank variables.
The reserve requirement ratio r, which is the same for all individual banks, is assumed to act
as a scalar in the γ  function.  Then, the proportion γ (.) can be re-written linearly as,








i i , i r , i , i γ + β = γ                                                       (3-7)
where the γ
* function can be interpreted as representing the bank’s asset portfolio allocation
decisions.
In practical sense, observing the interest rates that each individual bank has on the
bonds and loans in their asset portfolio seems to be infeasible in terms of data collection.
Therefore, a proxy variable can be specified which reflects the portfolio allocation based on
the return trade-off between bonds and loans in the bank assets.  The share of government
security stocks in the total bank assets may serve as an indicator of the substitution between
bonds and other assets.  After an expansionary deposit shock to the bank balance sheets, an
increase in this share implies either a relative contraction or no change in the other bank
assets, which implies a reduced potential for new loans.  On the other hand, a higher security
portfolio share in assets may function as a buffer stock against contractionary deposit shocks
and increase the potential for new loans.  However, it is expected that the buffer stocking
behaviour and the sticky nature of the allocation between liquid and illiquid assets affect the
bank lending decision with certain time lags.  With regard to these illustrations, the γ
*(.)
function in the equation (3-7) can be represented as a linear function of an observable
individual bank variable, denoted with its cross-section and time dimensions as in the
following,





* b   i , i − δ = γ                                                                 (3-8)
where bi,t-1 is the one-period lagged value of the government security stocks share in total
assets of each individual bank.  Then, the loan supply function given by the equation (3-6)
becomes
() it 1 - t i,
S
it R b   L δ + β =                                                              (3-9)
indicating that the loan supply of the i-th bank at time t is determined proportionally to the
change in its reserves, where this proportion is represented  by (β  + δ  bi,t-1).17
For estimation purposes, the loan supply function in (3-9) can be transformed into a
linear stochastic dynamic model of bank lending as in:
( ) it i t it it 1 - t i, 1 - t i, it v z R ln . b   L ln      L ln + η + λ + φ ′ + ∆ δ + β + ∆ α = ∆              (3-10)
where ‘ln’ denotes the natural logarithm while ‘∆ ’ is a first-difference operator.  According to
this model, the loan growth rate (∆ lnLit) is explained by its lagged values (∆ lnLi,t-1), by the
proportion of the bank reserves growth rate (∆ lnRit) and by some other balance-sheet-specific
factors (zit), which are expected to influence the bank lending behaviour significantly.
However, to observe the response of the bank lending behaviour to a change in the monetary
policy, the growth rate of bank reserves at the individual bank level is not an appropriate
indicator of the policy change.  It is not eligible for differentiating the supply and demand
effects of the monetary policy on the bank loans, which generates an identification problem in
the estimation process.  Therefore, “the change in the reserve requirement ratio (∆ rt)”, which
is the main determinant of the change in the level of bank reserves, should rather be used as a
proxy variable for the monetary policy indicator.  Fortunately, the absence of the cross-
section dimension of this variable reflects the fact that a policy change hits all the banks with
the same sort of shock.  Consequently, any response in the loan supply can be interpreted as a
supply shock led by the monetary authority’s policy decision on setting the reserve
requirement ratio.  Within this context, the model (3-10) should be denoted as
     ( ) it i t it t 1 - t i, 1 - t i, it v z r . b   L ln      L ln + η + λ + φ ′ + ∆ δ + β + ∆ α = ∆                 (3- 0 1 ′ )
After some brief information about the data resources, the following sections present
the dynamic panel data estimation results of the bank lending model with its variants under
different bank categories mentioned in the previous part of the thesis.  In the recent literature
on the bank lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, Kashyap and Stein
(2000) and Favero et al. (1999) have employed similar models to estimate the bank lending
behaviour in the US and European countries respectively.  However, although the modelling
strategy does not diverge from theirs considerably the estimation methodology employed in
this study has superior features in econometric sense as is going to be stated in the next
section.
3.2.  The Econometric Methodology
The use of panel data, pooling the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the
data, in economic analysis is more informative than the one-dimensional data analysis,18
especially in the analysis of macroeconomic subjects with microeconomic dynamics at the
firm level.  The estimation biases due to the individual heterogeneity of cross-sectional units
and biases due to the cross-sectional aggregation of the data can be reduced through the use of
panel data estimation methods.  However, the panel data models incorporating the dynamic
nature of the macroeconomic relationships involve more improved approaches than the
standard panel data estimation methods.
The following represents a first-order dynamic panel data model
T , 1,........         t N , 1,........ i              u x ) L ( y y it it 1 t , i it = = + β ′ + α = −
where  it i t it v   u + η + λ =  is an error term with time (λ t) and individual (η i) effects, L is a lag-
operator and xit is a vector of explanatory variables.  The “it” subscripts of the variables
denote the observation of the i-th cross-sectional unit in the t-th period.  The inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable in the standard panel data models leads to biased and inconsistent
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators because of the correlation between yi,t-1 and uit.
This correlation is due to yi,t-1’s being a function of the individual effects η i  as a result of yit’s
being a function of η i in the regression.  Therefore, a transformation is needed so that it
induces uncorrelated error terms and individual effects in the model.  In this respect, neither
Within Transformation of the fixed effects estimator nor the random effects Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) estimator is an unbiased and consistent estimator.
A first-difference transformation suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) produces
consistent estimators with an instrumental variable estimation
4.  However, the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), provides
efficiency improvements by exploiting the available moment conditions in the first difference
transformation.  Further, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an extended GMM estimation in
which additional moment conditions are imposed to gain more precision in estimations.  In
addition to the instruments available for the first-differenced equations, other valid
instruments are specified for the equations in levels.  In Blundell and Bond (1998), where the
efficiency improvement of this extended GMM approach has been verified, the estimation
performed with the instruments for both the first-differenced and levels equations is called the
                                                
4 See Baltagi (1995) for a detailed discussion of panel data topics and the related literature on the dynamic panel
data estimation, and see Erlat (1997) for a later survey of panel data topics.19
system GMM estimation and denoted by GMM-SYS, while that for only first-differenced
equations is called the standard first-differenced GMM estimation and denoted by GMM-DIF.
Arellano and Bond (1991) provide diagnostic testing procedures to test the validity of
the model specification in dynamic panel data estimations.  The first test statistic for testing
the overall significance of the independent variables is a Wald test, which is asymptotically
distributed as χ
2 with the degrees of freedom computed with respect to the number of
restricted coefficients.  The same statistics can also be computed to test the significances of
the time and individual effects.
The null hypothesis of the validity of the GMM instruments can be tested by a Sargan
test of over-identifying restrictions.   This test is asymptotically distributed as χ
2 with the
degrees of freedom computed with respect to the number of the over-identification
restrictions.  Similarly, a Difference-Sargan test statistic can be computed to test the validity
of GMM-SYS estimates against GMM-DIF estimates, by testing the significance of the
instruments used in levels equations as additional parameters.  The statistic is simply the
difference between the two Sargan test statistics computed with the GMM-SYS and GMM-
DIF estimates respectively.  The distribution of this statistic is χ
2 with the degrees of freedom
equal to the number of instruments used in levels equations.  It has to be noted that only the
two-step GMM estimation produces heteroskedasticity-consistent Sargan tests.
The consistency of the GMM estimates requires non serial-correlated errors vit.  In this
regard, two test statistics can be computed to test for the absence of first- and second-order
serial correlations in the first differenced residuals, which are denoted by m1 and m2 in the
context of Arellano and Bond (1991).  These two statistics have standard normal distributions
asymptotically.  As stated by Arellano and Bond (1991: 281), “[S]ince the vit are first
differences of serially uncorrelated errors, E(vit vi,t-1) need not be zero, but the consistency of
the GMM estimators above hinges heavily upon the assumption that E(vit vi,t-2)=0.”  Thus, the
small value of m2 statistics is the indication of the absence of the serial correlation problem.
In this study, the model estimations that are going to be performed by the GMM
approach make use of a two-step GMM estimation that results in asymptotically more
efficient standard errors than a one-step GMM estimation.  However, the standard errors of
the coefficients are computed with a small-sample variance correction suggested by
Windmeijer (2000) to eliminate a downward bias in the standard errors of the two-step
estimators.  The test statistics computed for the models are based on the two-step residuals.20
The GMM instruments that are going to be employed in the two-step estimations of the
interested models can be represented in general notation as follows:
For first-differenced equations: yi,t-2, yi,t-3, yi,t-4; xi,t-2, xi,t-3, xi,t-4
For levels equations: ∆ yi,t-1; ∆ xi,t-1
In the first-differenced equations, the lags of the instruments are limited up to 4 periods not to
cause finite sample biases as a result of using numerous instruments, because the number of
regressors in the models is high and the cross-sectional sample size used in the empirical
analyses is not large enough due to data unavailability.
In the empirical analysis of bank lending behaviour, using the GMM estimation
approach rather than the OLS approach allows the control of unobserved heterogeneity and
simultaneity in the panel data estimation.  The heterogeneity resulting from bank-specific
effects, and the possible simultaneity between these individual effects and the regressors, can
be taken into consideration in estimations through the GMM approach.  Moreover, the GMM
estimation produces more efficient estimators against the problem of the potential
endogeneity of the regressors.  In this respect, the regressors of the models used in the
empirical part of the thesis are variables from bank balance sheets that are inevitably
correlated with each other.  Therefore, the superiority of a GMM type estimation approach in
dynamic modelling of bank lending behaviour is obvious.
3.3.  The Data
The analyses are based on the balance sheet data of 58 deposit money banks (DMBs),
covering the period of 1988-1999 in Turkey
5.  The starting year coincides with the beginning
of the regular publication of the balance sheet data in Banks in Turkey, which is published
yearly by The Banks Association of Turkey.  However, the ending year of the data is limited
to 1999 because of the fact that the banking sector has been experiencing a tremendous re-
structuring process since mid-1999 through amendments in the banking legislations and
through the ownership transfers of some banks to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund.
The bank balance sheet data employed in the empirical investigations exclude the data of
banks that have not operated at least five years in order to avoid deficiencies in econometric
estimations due to an insufficient time-dimension.
                                                
5 The list of the DMBs employed in the empirical analyses is given in the Appendix.21
The frequency of the data is yearly and the figures of the bank balance sheets represent
the end-of-year records of the items.  Although it is known that a quarterly data set is more
relevant for the reflection of the balance sheet dynamics on bank lending behaviour, the time
span of the available quarterly data at the individual bank level is very short for econometric
investigations.
The source of the time series data used in the empirical analyses is the Electronic Data
Delivery System and the various publications of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
3.4.  Estimation Results
The impact of monetary policy on the bank lending behaviour of deposit money banks
and the transmission of this impact to bank dependent firms constitutes the basis for defining
a bank lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.  Following the approach in
Kashyap and Stein (2000), the bank lending channel can be empirically tested by
investigating bank lending response at individual bank level.  The disproportionate loan
supply effects of shocks to bank reserves reflect the different degrees of friction in banks’
raising funds against monetary shocks.  This variation in the degrees of friction can be
explained with financial market imperfections, the outcomes of which are magnified for some
banks with weak balance sheet features.  In this context, the disproportionate effects reflected
on bank dependent firms might imply real effects on the aggregate economy.
Within the framework of the above underpinnings provided by economic theory, the
variants of the loan supply function given by equation (3- 0 1 ′ ) are employed in testing the
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In equation (3-11), the definitions of the variables are as follows:
Lit:  total bank loans deflated by the GNP deflator (1987=100).
∆ rt: the change in the reserve requirement ratio (the ratio is the rate on 3-month to 1-year time
deposits)
bit:  government security stocks / total assets
cit :  share holders’ equity + net income / deposits + non-deposit funds
sit:   total security portfolio / total assets22
Bit:  government security stocks deflated by the GNP deflator (1987=100).
In the model, the growth rate of bank loans is not only explained by the change in the
monetary policy, but also by some balance-sheet-specific factors such as the bank capital ratio
and the security-asset ratio, represented by the variables cit and sit respectively.  The bank
capital ratio is an indicator of the balance sheet strength so that a high bank capital ratio
implies that the bank can support risks of new lending.  The security-asset ratio is an indicator
of the bank’s portfolio liquidity and, hence, it reflects the relative asset quality of the bank
balance sheet.  The banks’ management of liquid assets to avert from interest rate risk may
help providing loanable funds at lower costs and hence, increase bank loans.  As such, higher
bank capital ratio and security-asset ratio encourage banks to re-allocate funds more to
lending in the next period and increase the loan growth rate.  Therefore, the expected signs of
bank capital ratio and loan-asset ratio in the loan supply models are φφφφ , ϕϕϕϕ> > > > 0.
The government debt instruments held by banks are another factor that determines the
loan supply growth rate.  Especially in Turkey, where domestic borrowing relies heavily on
the resources of the financial markets, it is expected that the growth rate of the loan supply
will be closely related to the growth rate of the government security stocks of banks.  On the
one hand, allocating the bank assets so as to hold more government securities may decrease
the availability of private loans.  Hence, the expected sign of such behaviour in the model
may be γγγγ<< < < 0 indicating that the domestic debt finance through resources of the banking system
crowds out bank loans to the private sector.  On the other hand, public debt sales to the
banking system may increase the loan supply if these sales are a consequence of a reserve
accommodation policy.  So, the growth of the government security holdings of banks may as
well be positively related to the growth of the bank loans, i.e., γγγγ>> > > 0, indicating a crowding in
effect.              
Another point to note is that the increased holdings of securities may serve as buffer
stocks to cushion the adverse lending effects of shocks to bank reserves.  This buffer stock
function of government security stocks is incorporated in the model through the variable bi,t-1.
For instance, if a contractionary monetary shock to a bank balance sheet occurs, the growth
rate of the loan supply may not decrease despite the contractionary effects on bank reserves,
because banks with high values of bi,t-1 ratio can continue lending by liquidating their security
stocks.  This explains the buffer stocking function of the security portfolio in the bank assets.
However, if the banks with a high bi,t-1 ratio do not follow a buffer stock behaviour, then23
holding high ratios of security stocks can simply be explained by a risk aversion motive.
Thus, the expected signs of the relation between the change in the policy variable and the loan
supply growth rate in the model are ββββ<< < < 0 and either δδδδ> > > > 0 or δδδδ<< < <  0, depending on the presence of
a buffer stock behaviour or a risk aversion motive respectively.
Bank size matters to bank lending behaviour because of the fact that smaller banks
experience more frictions in raising external finance and because they are exposed to more
default risk due to the high costs of evaluating and monitoring loan contracts.  Although small
banks have lower shares in the credit markets, a monetary shock that affects their lending
behaviour may generate significant real effects in the aggregate economy.  As argued by
Hancock and Wilcox (1998), loans of small banks are “high powered” so that the marginal
effect of a reduction in their loans has more significant effects on economic activity than does
that of a reduction in large banks’ loans.  The disproportionate loan supply responses of banks
to reserve shocks due to their size differences may provide evidence for the occurrence of real
output effects transmitted by a bank lending channel.
In order to reflect the bank size effects of a policy change on bank lending behaviour,
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In equation (3-12), Sj denotes the size-dummy variables in four size categories:
S1 = 1   for banks with assets below 150 million $
    = 0   otherwise
S2 = 1   for banks with assets between 150-500 million $
    = 0   otherwise
S3 = 1   for banks with assets between 500-1500 million $
    = 0   otherwise
S4 = 1   for banks with assets above 1500 million $
    = 0   otherwise
The signs of the regression coefficients related to these size-dummy variables are expected to
be the same as mentioned before, i.e., ββββ j< < < < 0 and δδδδ j> > > > 0  or  δδδδ j< < < < 0.  However, the relative24
magnitudes of the sums of β  and δ  for each bank size are expected to be as follows: | || | ββββ 1+δδδδ 1| || |  > > > >
| || | ββββ 2+δδδδ 2| || |  > > > >  | || | ββββ 3+δδδδ 3| || |  > > > >  | || | ββββ 4+δδδδ 4| || | .  The sum of the β  and δ  coefficients represents the total loan supply
responses, including the loan supply effects of banks’ holding securities for buffer stocking
and risk aversion purposes.  These relative magnitudes imply that the loan supply responses
of banks to the monetary policy change become higher as the bank size decreases.
The two-step GMM estimation results of the loan supply models (3-11) and (3-12) are
exhibited in Table 3.1 together with OLS estimations to allow the efficiency comparison.  The
estimated models pass the specification tests.  The Sargan test statistics approve the validity
of the GMM instruments.  According to the m1 and m2 test statistics, the consistency of the
GMM estimators is verified, as there is no evidence of a second-order serial correlation in the
differenced residuals of the models.  Further, the Difference-Sargan test statistics provides no
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the additional moment conditions used
in the GMM-SYS estimations.  Therefore, the ultimate economic inferences derived from the
models can be based on the GMM-SYS estimators.
In the GMM-SYS estimates of the model (3-11) presented in Table 3.1, no significant
monetary policy effect on the loan supply growth could be found.  The model (3-12), which is
the modified version of the model (3-11) formulated by incorporating bank size effects on the
bank lending behaviour, also has the same finding.  The absence of such an influence under
the bank size categorization rules out the evidence for the potential of a bank lending channel
to exist in the monetary transmission process.  The lack of a relationship between the
monetary policy and the bank lending may be due to two reasons.  First, the monetary policy
effects on bank lending decisions may be neutralised by some other effects.  Bank lending
decisions may be more responsive to bank specific factors such as balance sheet strength and
portfolio risk than to changes in the monetary stance.  Second, the reserve requirement ratio
may not be an effective monetary policy instrument for the control of the bank reserves.  It
may appear as a result of the fact that policy instruments become useless when an
accommodative monetary action has to be followed by the monetary authority - especially
when there is an increasing need for domestic debt finance as there is in Turkey.  In these
respects, the estimated regression coefficients of the explanatory variables that are common to
both of the models (3-11) and  (3-12) indicate some evidence for these two reasons of
monetary policy ineffectiveness.25
Table 3.1  The Estimation Results of the Loan Supply Models (3-11) and (3-12)
Model (3-11) Model (3-12)





































































































































































Joint 20.5*(9) 51.8**(9) 32.0**(9) 94.9**(15) 112**(15) 38.6**(15)
Dummy  74.7**(10) 49.4**(9)  49.9**(10) 71.1**(10) 50.1**(9) 44.1**(10)
Time  67.9**(9) 49.4.6**(9)  46.2**(9) 67.9**(9) 50.1**(9) 37.9**(9)
Specification Tests
Sargan 43.7(111) 43.1 (156) 40.8 (177) 35.1 (249)
Diff-Sargan -0.6  (45) -5.73 (72)
m1 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ N(0,1) -1.15 -2.04* -1.85* -1.39 -2.24* -2.15*
m2 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ N(0,1) 1.29 0.67 0.36 1.42 0.94 1.09
Notes: (1) Figures in italics under the coefficient estimates are standard errors.  Figures in parentheses are
degrees of freedom.  Asterisks * and ** indicate significance at 5 % and 1 % levels.  (2) Time dummies are
included in the regression estimations.  (3) The differenced equation instruments are 2- to 4-lagged values of all
variables while the level equation instruments are 1-lag 1
st differenced variables.  (4) Computations are done
with DPD 1.2 for Ox and the details on computations can be found in Doornik, Arellano and Bond (2001).26
The statistically significant coefficients of the variables ci,t-1 and si,t-1 in the models, as
seen in Table 3.1, indicate the crucial role of bank-specific factors on lending decisions.  The
positive relationship between the loan supply growth rate and the one-year-lag value of the
capital ratio (ci,t-1) indicates that the adequacy of the bank capital to meet short-term liabilities
is an encouraging factor for banks’ future loans.  Moreover, the security-asset ratio (sit), which
is an indicator of the liquidity and the quality of the asset portfolio, has a plausible
relationship with the loan supply growth rate.  The positive relationship between the lagged
value of the security-asset ratio and the loan supply growth rate asserts the stimulation effect
of hedging short-term liability risks on future loans.  In other words, lower liquidity and
interest  rate  risks attained  through holding short-term securities with high returns relieve the
asset risk management task and hence, allows generating new funds for lending at lower
costs.
The coefficient estimates of the variable ∆ lnBi,t in the models give some clue about the
statistical insignificance of the loan supply effect of a change in the monetary policy (∆ rt)
which can be interpreted as the monetary authority’s lack of control on bank reserves.  The
variables ∆ lnBi,t and its one-period lag are included in the models in order to reveal the
influence of domestic debt dynamics on the lending behaviour of banks in Turkey.  As seen in
Table 3.1, the statistically significant coefficient of ∆ lnBi,t estimated in both models (3-11)
and (3-12) is an indication of how debt sales to the banking system affect the supply of bank
loans.  The growth rate of the loan supply is computed to be positively associated with the
growth rate of government debt holdings of deposit money banks, consistent with the reserve
accommodation policy of 1990s in Turkey.  The increase in debt finance through domestic
borrowing has not only been putting a fiscal pressure on money markets, but also decreasing
the scope for an independent monetary policy.  In order not to increase the cost of domestic
debt financing monetary authority had to follow an accommodative monetary policy.  The
high levels of public sector borrowing requirements in Turkey, and the heavy reliance on
domestic borrowing have led to the dominance of public debt instruments on financial market
dynamics.  In this regard, debt sales to the banking system influence the money stock in the
form of an endogenous response to the fiscal policy and hence, this weakens the causation
from monetary policy instruments to monetary aggregates in Turkey
6.
                                                
6 See Özmen and Koru (2000) for a study investigating the budget deficits and money growth relationship in the
Turkish economy.27
The failure in finding a statistically significant relationship between the loan supply
growth rate and the change in the monetary policy indicator weakens the empirical evidence
for a bank lending channel to exist in the Turkish economy.  However, estimation results
point out a significant accommodative characteristic of loan expansion at the individual bank
level, which may explain the absence of the relationship between monetary policy and the
supply of bank loans in Turkey.
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study investigated the lending behaviour of deposit money banks in Turkey in
order to test the presence of a potential for the bank lending channel.  In doing this, the
balance sheet data of 58 deposit money banks have been used for the period 1988-1999.  The
testing procedure has been based on the dynamic panel data estimations of loan supply
models, on the premise that the loan supply responses of banks to reserve shocks have
implications for the presence of a bank lending channel.
The fact that firms are dependent on bank loans for investment finance and working
capital needs renders the real economy vulnerable to shocks in bank lending behaviour.  It has
been assumed that these shocks have real effects when they are distributed disproportionately
on firms.  The different structural characteristics of banks can be the reason for the
disproportionate lending effects in the real economy.  Therefore, the loan supply models
estimated in the empirical part of the study have also been formulated with specifications
reflecting the disproportionate loan supply effects of banks as a result of their size differences.
The results of the loan supply model estimations provide no evidence of a potential for
a bank lending channel to exist in the Turkish economy.  Such an outcome is reflected in the
lack of a significant relationship between the change in the monetary policy indicator and the
real growth rate of the loan supply in the estimated models.  Categorizing the loan supply
responses of banks with respect to bank size differences has not provided any significant
improvement in revealing the evidence of an active bank lending channel.  The empirical
results indicate that bank lending behaviour is influenced significantly by bank specific
factors such as the balance sheet strength and the quality of the asset portfolio, and by debt
sales to the banking system.
The lack of the monetary policy control on bank reserves may be interpreted as an
outcome of the heavy reliance of banks on government debt instruments in the asset
management task, particularly in bank reserve management.  Due to the fact that the28
government debt instruments can be hold against liquidity requirements and used as collateral
in the interbank money market, deposit money banks prefer to hold a high share of their assets
in the form of government securities.  This may be considered to crowd out funds for private
loans available to bank dependent borrowers on the one hand and crowd in private loans
through its advantages in the management of portfolio risk on the other hand.  However, no
evidence of a crowding-out-effect could be found in the empirical analysis at the individual
bank level.  On the contrary, the positive relationship found between the real growth rate of
the government security holdings of banks and the real growth rate of bank loans indicates a
crowding-in-effect in bank balance sheets.  This effect can be explained by the reserve
accommodation policy that monetary authority had to follow inevitably under the fiscal
conditions dominated by public sector debt dynamics in Turkey.  Because deposit money
banks’ are the major customers in the domestic debt market, the expansion in the asset
demand of the banking system is supported by the accommodative monetary policy.  The
constraint of not increasing the cost of domestic debt financing puts fiscal pressure on the
effectiveness of monetary policies.  Any failure in domestic debt financing would call for the
monetisation of the public sector deficits.
As the result of the dominance of the public debt instruments over the financial market
dynamics associated with the accommodative monetary policy, the control of the monetary
authority on the money stocks becomes questionable.  In this respect, analysing the presence
of a bank lending channel under these conditions appears to be misty unless an effective
exogenous supply shock to bank reserves could be defined successfully.  Observing any
asymmetry in the loan supply effect of a monetary policy on banks seems to be possible
provided that the monetary authority is capable of controlling bank reserves effectively.
To conclude, the prevalence of reserve accommodation policy, and hence the absence
of an effective tight monetary policy, does not enable the observation of disproportionate loan
supply effects possible to observe in case of an exogenous monetary policy shock.  Thus, the
empirical analysis provides no evidence of a bank lending channel.  However, the estimation
results obviously show that the lending behaviour of deposit money banks in Turkey are
significantly affected by the dynamics imposed through the domestic debt finance policy.28
Appendix:  The List of the Deposit Money Banks Used in the Analyses
SIZE 4 SIZE 3 SIZE 2 SIZE 1
  1. T.C. Ziraat Bankası P 11. BankEkspres A.Ş. 31. Citibank N.A. T 46. Midland Bank A.Ş.T
  2. Türkiye İş Bankası 12. Kentbank A.Ş. 32. Tekstil Bankası A.Ş. 47. Türk Sakura Bank A.Ş. T
+
  3. Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş. P 13. Alternatif Bank A.Ş. 33. YurtTicaret ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 48. Abn Amro Bank N.V. T
  4. Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 14. Etibank A.Ş. P* 34. EGS Bankası A.Ş. 49. Turkish Bank A.Ş. T
+
  5. Türkiye Halk Bankası P 15. Eskişehir Bankası A.Ş. 35. Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş. T 50. MNG Bank A.Ş.
  6. Akbank T.A.Ş. 16. İnterbank 36. Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş. 51. Bayındırbank A.Ş.
  7. Türkiye Vakiflar Bankası T.A.O. P 17. Yaşarbank A.Ş. 37. HSBC Bank A.Ş. T 52. Adabank A.Ş.
  8. Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 18. Demirbank T.A.Ş. 38. SociéteGénérale (SA) T 53. Banca di Roma S.P.A. T
  9. Pamukbank T.A.Ş. 19. Sümerbank A.Ş. P* 39. BankKapital Türk A.Ş. T
+
54. Credit Lyonnais Turkey T
10. Türk Ticaret Banksı T.A.Ş. 20. İktisat Bankası T.A.Ş. 40. Bnp-Ak Dresdner Bank A.Ş. T 55. Bank Mellat T
21. Toprakbank A.Ş. 41. The Chase Manhattan Bank T 56. Derbank A.Ş.
22. Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş. T 42. Westdeutsche Landesbank G. T 57. Habib Bank Limited T
23. Finans Bank A.Ş. 43. Oyak Bank A.Ş. 58. Kıbrıs Kredi Bankası Ltd. T
24. Koçbank A.Ş. 44. Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş T
25. Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. 45. Sitebank A.Ş. T
+
26. Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş.
27. Şekerbank T.A.Ş.
28. Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. T
+
29. Türk Ekonomi Banaksı A.Ş.
30. Egebank A.Ş.
P and T denote the public and foreign banks respectively.
* Sümerbank A.Ş. and Etibank A.Ş. were privatised in 1995 and 1998 respectively.
+   Birleşik Türk Körfez Bankası A.Ş. and Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş. have become domestically owned in 1995 while Sitebank A.Ş.,
Turkish Bank A.Ş. and Türk Sakura Bank A.Ş. have become domestically owned in 1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively.29
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